Abstract: This paper analyzes the changes in public-private sector earnings differentials for local residents in urban China between 2002 and 2007. We find that earnings gaps across ownership have been reducing during this period and that the convergence trend has been in favor of the private and semi-public sectors as opposed to the public sector. This is in sharp contrast to what occurred at the turn of the century, when employees of public administration and enterprises were found to enjoy a very much privileged situation. On the one hand, differences in endowments are found to play a growing role in explaining earnings differentials. On the other hand, although starting to become less an issue, segmentation across ownership remains important, especially for high-wage earners.
Introduction
Three decades of economic reform have brought tremendous changes in every sector of China's economy. The labor market is no exception, and it has been particularly affected by important policy and institutional changes at the turn of the century. On the one hand, the state sector reform was speeded up after the Chinese Communist Party's 15th Congress held in September 1997, which encouraged both the corporatization of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the restructuring of small SOEs. On the other hand, the same Congress recognized private enterprises as an important component of the economy and stressed the rule of law. As a direct consequence, the urban labor market has been reshaped through the unprecedented growth in unemployment and the reallocation of labor from the public to the private sector. In the meantime, competition among workers in the urban labor market has sharply increased on account of a massive rural labor force exodus, which led an estimated 140 million rural workers to move to cities by 2008.
In the context of a transitional economy, these dramatic changes raise a number of issues on the direction toward which the urban labor market is moving. A key aspect to be explored is whether the labor market has transformed into a market-oriented one and whether enterprises with different ownership operate in a competitive way. Academic research conducted on data collected from the mid-nineties to the very beginning of the twenty-first century highlights the incompleteness of the reforms and the "unfinished economic revolution" (Lardy, 1998) as well as the remaining rigidities in a segmented labor market made up of several segments with distinct rules for wage determination and a limited mobility of labor between segments (e.g. Chen, Démurger and Fournier 2005; Démurger et al. 2007a; Dong and Bowles 2002; Knight and Song 2003; Li and Bai 2005) . Evidence on micro data from the mid-nineties shows that workers in the public sector had very limited incentives to move out and that one of the main reasons for this immobility was the higher-than-market-clearing-level earnings premium provided to workers in state-owned units (Chen et al. 2005; Zhao 2002 ). Moreover, for the period from 1995 to 2002, Démurger et al. (2007a) find strong evidence of increasing segmentation across ownership with the gap between the privileged segments of the labor market and the most competitive segments widening over time.
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Policy-related rationales for studying labor market segmentation issues are related to both efficiency, as illustrated by the literature on the public-private sector earnings gap in developing countries or economies in transition (Adamchik and Bedi 2000; Boeri and Terell 2002; Falaris 2004; Lokshin and Jovanovic 2003) and income inequality (Meng and Zhang 2001) . A multi-tiered labor market in which wages are not only determined by skill differentials, but also by different institutional arrangements may have strong implications in terms of both labor allocation across sectors and income distribution among workers. In China, where the so-called iron rice bowl (tiefanwan) of lifetime employment with the associated welfare state had dominated for years before it was completely dismantled in 1994 (Knight and Song 2005) , the issue of the public sector efficiency also appears of special importance. Moreover, the question of income distribution is essential to any government concerned with smooth economic development and social safety. With the growth of China's economy and rising average wages, earnings gap triggered a vigorous debate in China. In this context, ownership is also a fairly important question since it is linked with the issue of whether the government can provide an equal and efficient business environment for all sorts of companies to develop and maximize social welfare. Given that the number of enterprises in the public sector decreased from about 99% of total companies in 1978 to merely 10% in 2007, it is also interesting to explore whether the remaining public sector still enjoys a privileged position in the labor market through particular government policies.
Macroeconomic data on average wages of staff and workers in urban China show an increasing trend since the mid-nineties (Figure 1 ). The average wage in 2007 was 2,060 Yuan a month, 5.7 times higher than the figure in 1995 (in constant 2007 prices). Although the increase has been rapid for every type of ownership, some discrepancies emerged over time, the most remarkable being a narrowing gap between the public and the private sectors. Indeed, while average wages in 1995 were the highest in the "other ownership" (private sector) category, they turned to be lower than The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the development of various types of enterprises in China. Section 3 introduces the dataset along with some descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses econometric results on earnings equations by enterprise ownership.
Section 5 and Section 6 present decomposition results of earnings gaps across ownership during 2002-07. Section 7 concludes.
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Economic reforms and the evolution of ownership
After China became a socialist country in 1949, most of the means of production belonged to the state, and private and individual economic activities were made illegal. Therefore, within the first five-year plan period, the percentage of public ownership increased from 21.3% in 1952 to 92.9% in 1956 . When the economic reforms started in 1978, the national economy was strongly dominated by public ownership, which was composed of state-owned companies and collective enterprises.
State-owned companies and collective enterprises accounted for respectively 24% and 76% of the total number of industrial companies, and 78% and 22% of the total industrial production.
One major aspect of the economic reform was to encourage the development of the non-state sector in the economy. Through revising a series of laws and regulations, the government gradually allowed private and foreign companies to co-exist with state-owned and collective companies. In 1988, the State Council issued the "Tentative Stipulations on Private Enterprises" to govern the registration and management of private firms, and in 1993, the Company Law provided the legal framework for the development of limited liability companies and shareholding companies (Démurger et al. 2007a ).
Hence, various forms of non-public ownership such as private-owned, foreign-invested, joint-venture, share-holding, stock companies and self-employed became alternatives to former state-owned companies. More recently, efforts have been made to ensure a fairer competition between the public and the private sectors and to open more industries to the private sector. In 2003, new regulations allowed non-state enterprises to enter steel, aluminum and even some part of the national defense industries. In February 2005, the State Council issued "36 Suggestions to Encourage and Support Non-State-Owned Economic Development" in order to reduce barriers to market entry and to stimulate private investment.
The development of the non-state sector helped promoting competition among all the companies as well as allocating the resources more efficiently. Before the reform, since the resources were allocated according to the plan and the economy was dominated by public ownership, there was no competition among enterprises or employees. Allowing private and foreign companies to enter the labor market made it possible to improve the national economy as a whole and to promote prosperity.
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The other advantage was the alleviation of the employment pressure. With the baby boom and soldiers transferring to non-military sectors, the newly increasing labor force reached more than 10 million every year and the non-state sector became a major channel to absorb the growing labor force.
Hence, whereas employment in the public sector had kept rising continuously until the mid-nineties, it started to decrease in 1995, with a huge acceleration in 1998 (-18%), the pivotal year in SOEs reforms. Since then, the number of workers in both SOEs and urban collective enterprises clearly indicate a significant shift in the employment structure at the turn of the century, China experiencing a situation somewhat similar to Eastern European countries in the process of moving the labor force from the public to the private sector.
Data and descriptive analysis

Summary statistics by ownership
The data used in this paper comes from two sources: the Chinese Household Income Project Table 2 .
The gender distribution does not change much across years, with males representing 56-57% of urban workers and being particularly concentrated in SOEs where they account for respectively 59.5% and While it is still the lowest share of males across ownership, the difference is now not significant anymore with other categories (apart from SOEs). As documented further below, this change reflects an improving situation of UCEs, where increased competition may have boosted productivity and attracted more talented workers.
< Insert Table 2 >
The comparison between 2002 and 2007 shows a slight decrease in the average age of the workforce that is more marked in UCEs and in the private sector than in the public sector (SOEs and GAIs). In both years, the public sector employs older workers than the private sector does. As expected with the expansion of higher education after 1999, the average educational attainment of the workforce, measured in years of schooling, has substantially increased over time, by almost one year in the 5-year period (from 11.34 years to 12.22 years). Except GAIs, which were employing the most calculated by dividing total annual earnings by the number of declared hours worked in a year. In addition, earnings are adjusted for provincial purchasing power differences by using an updated set of Brandt and Holz (2006) urban provincial-level spatial price deflators in order to account for differences in living standards across cities. Tables 4 and 5 
The evolution of earnings and their distribution by ownership
< Insert
The determinants of hourly earnings
where subscript r∈ [1, 5] represents the five different ownership categories defined above. w ir is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings (adjusted for provincial purchasing power differences) for individual i in enterprise r. X ir is a vector of her individual characteristics and β gives the set of returns to each observed socio-demographic characteristic. X includes gender, education (measured in years of schooling as reported in the surveys), work experience 10 and its square, work experience in the current occupation, on-the-job training (dummy variable), regional dummies for coastal provinces and for capital cities, and company size. The residual u ir stands for all the unobservable factors that may affect individual hourly earnings w. Hence, the range of returns to education depending on enterprise ownership moved from 5.64%-8.57% suggesting that the experience that counts for FIEs is experience accumulated in the enterprise rather than the overall experience (which may have been accumulated in the less efficient public or semi-public sectors).
< Insert
Returns to gender also exhibit noteworthy differences across ownership and over time. In 2002, being a male in PIEs increased log hourly wages by about 21.9% while the increase was only 7% in GAIs. The "male premium" increased dramatically over time, especially in the public and the semi-public sectors, and reached levels comprised between 16.5% (in GAIs) and 25% (in PIEs). This partly reflects the findings by Song and Li (2010) that gender wage inequality increased during the period 2002-07. Interestingly, FIEs do not appear to favor males more than females since the coefficient for the gender dummy is never significant.
Finally, the coefficient estimates for being located in a coastal province (Beijing, Jiangsu or Guangdong) show a premium of living in the coast in all enterprises but FIEs in both years. The comparison of coefficients over time suggests an increasing "coastal premium" for SOEs and UCEs, and a slightly decreasing premium for PIEs.
Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions
In order to analyze earnings differentials between individuals belonging to different enterprises, we first use the Oaxaca-Blinder method (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973 ) to decompose mean differences in log earnings into two components: one attributable to the differences in mean endowments of workers across ownership, and one attributable to differences in returns to these endowments.
The observed average log earnings difference between two enterprises of different ownership, r 1 and r 2 , can be defined as:
( 2) where bars indicate mean values. Substituting equation (1) into (2) yields:
where hats denote estimated coefficients from separate earnings equations.
Assuming that a non-discriminatory wage structure β * is known, the log wage differential can be decomposed in the following way (Neumark 1988 ):
Equation (4) shows that the earnings gap between ownership r 1 and ownership r 2 can be decomposed into two parts. The first term can be interpreted as the part of the log earnings differential due to differences in average individual characteristics between different ownerships. It measures how much individuals in ownership r 1 would earn if they had the same characteristics as those in ownership r 2 . The second term represents the amount by which earnings between two different ownerships differ from the assumed non-discriminatory wage structure. It is the "unexplained" or residual component of the earnings gap. This effect can be interpreted either as the part due to segmentation or to different productivity levels. In other words, the fact that individuals with the same characteristics are paid differently in different ownership might be due to different production processes that result in different individual productivity across ownership, or to particular institutional factors, such as monopolistic power that lead to the return gap. There are several ways of constructing the assumed non-discriminatory wage structure β * (Jann 2008) . In what follows, we present decompositions using the method proposed by Neumark (1988) , which assumes a pooled wage structure (including a group indicator as suggested by Jann (2008)) as the non-discriminatory wage structure. value and in percentage of the mean difference).
< Insert Table 6 >
The top panel in Table 6 The decomposition analysis presented in Table 6 highlights three main phenomena on the ownership dimension, which are of importance to understand the recent evolution of the labor market in urban China. First, both urban collectives and private enterprises have seen their relative position dramatically improving as compared to the public sector. Indeed, compared to both SOEs and GAIs, the huge decrease in the earnings gap comes from two concomitant forces: a convergence in endowments on the one hand, and a sharp reduction of segmentation against UCEs and PIEs on the other hand. This change is important in the sense that it signals a better integration of the domestic sectors -public, semi-public or private-, which never occurred before.
Second, although the dominant position of GAIs has been diminishing between 2002 and 2007, the comparatively still higher wages in GAIs may be attributed more importantly to employees' better endowments as compared to other sectors. This is especially the case when compared to UCEs and
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PIEs: differences in endowments account respectively for 50% and 67% of the earnings gap with GAIs in 2007 while the shares were only 12% and 27% in 2002. Say differently, the strong increase in segmentation in favor of GAIs that had been observed in the early 2000s (Démurger et al. 2007a ) is vanishing in the recent period both in absolute terms and as a share of log earnings differences, which may indicate a trend toward less protection of earnings in the public sector.
Third, the foreign sector continued to reinforce its position through both better characteristics as well as more pronounced segmentation, especially as compared to the public sector. Interestingly, the 
Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition approach only deals with the mean of the distribution and ignores differences along the distribution like its dispersion or skewness. However, as shown in Section 3, the distribution of hourly earnings differs across sectors. Hence, to complement the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, we use the decomposition technique proposed by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) that takes account of the whole earnings distribution.
The Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition method extends the Oaxaca-Blinder approach by accounting for the residual distribution so that the hourly earnings gap can be decomposed into three parts: the individual characteristics effect (resulting from a change in the distribution of the Xs), the return or "price" effect (resulting from a change in the βs) and the residual effect (or unobservable factors' influence).
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Following Juhn et al. (1993) , the residual u ir in equation (1) can be written as follows: (5) where θ ir is the percentile of an individual in the residual distribution, and F r is the cumulative distribution function of the earnings equation residuals (for individuals with characteristics X ir in ownership r).
Assuming that F * is a reference residual distribution and β * a reference wage structure 11 , two hypothetical hourly earnings distribution can be created as follows:
The first hypothetical set of wages given in equation (6) is computed by valuing each worker's characteristics in sector r 1 at the reference wage structure β * and her position in sector r 1 's residual distribution at the corresponding position in the reference residual distribution F * . The second hypothetical distribution for sector r 1 given in equation (7) results from giving each worker her own estimated returns to characteristics but the reference residual distribution F * .
The main feature of the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition approach is that it allows an analysis over the whole earnings distribution. If the notation stands for a summary statistic of the distribution of the corresponding variable, one can then write the following decomposition of the log earnings difference between two enterprises of different ownership, r 1 and r 2 :
Given the definitions above, the first right-hand side term simply reflects the individual characteristics effect, or the difference in observable quantities between the two sectors. The second term (into brackets) represents the return effect, or the difference in observable prices, and the third term represents the residual effect, expressed by the difference of two sectors' residual distribution.
< Insert Figure 3 >
11 As for the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the reference wage structure is estimated from a pooled model over the whole sample. The reference residual distribution is the average distribution over both samples. Decomposition results presented here are generated using the jmpierce.ado program for Stata.
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Results of Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompositions for each pair of ownership are displayed in were paying comparatively higher average wages to lowest-wage earners, while FIEs were offering higher wages to the 75 th percentile, which made the gap changing sign over the distribution (and may explain why the mean difference reported in Table 6 is not significant). Interestingly, while the gap in favor of SOEs at the bottom of the distribution appears to be equally explained by differences in quantity, price and residuals, the gap in favor of FIEs at the top of the distribution is mainly explained by different remuneration of characteristics (that more than compensate better characteristics for SOEs workers).
Fourth, as previously discussed, earnings differentials have substantially reduced between 2002
and 2007 for almost all pairs of sectors. Whole distributions provide a more complete view of this average evolution by highlighting some differences along the earnings distribution. Hence, the reduction in earnings gap tends to be more pronounced at the bottom of the distribution, thanks to a decreasing segmentation. This is particularly the case for the pairs SOEs-GAIs and UCEs-GAIs, suggesting that in the public sector, the wage structure has become more harmonized for the low-wage earners. In addition, distribution patterns for different ownerships at various percentiles have changed a lot, suggesting that wage setting mechanisms have experienced great changes during this period. In this respect, the foreign sector exhibits particularly interesting changes. Indeed, FIEs have clearly improved their position relative to both SOEs and GAIs, with a gap being now fully in favor of FIEs over the whole distribution, and with very clear differences at the top of the distribution, almost fully explained by segmentation in favor of FIEs. This probably reflects a proactive strategy from FIEs toward high-wage earners (that was already visible in 2002, although less clear-cut). Interestingly, the tiniest earnings differential for the pairs FIEs-SOEs and FIEs-GAIs is around the 25 th percentile, which indicates that for individuals below the median, wages across these ownerships are quite similar.
Finally, the 2007 graphs also indicate that segmentation still plays a fairly important role in explaining earnings gaps across ownership, with a particularly pronounced importance at the top of the distribution.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes wages inequality trends across ownership for the period 2002-07 and investigates the reasons behind the gap by decomposing the mean wages difference using Oaxaca-Blinder technique and analyzing the wages gap distribution using Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition method.
We find that while average earnings gaps were still fairly large across ownership sectors in 2002, halshs-00550348, version 1 -27 Dec 2010 CHIP-2002 and RUMIC-2007 survey data, urban sample, 7 provinces data, with16<=age<=60 for men and 16<=age<=55 for women, full-time employment and earning positive wages. Note: Ownership categories are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), government agencies or institutions (GAIs), urban collective enterprises (UCEs), private or individual enterprises (PIEs), and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). "Experience in current job" stands for the number of years in current occupation. "Company size" measures the number of employees in the company and is grouped into 4 ranks (following CHIP-2002), 1 represents 1-100; 2 represents 101-500; 3 represents 501-1000; 4 represents 1,000 and above. Table 2 . Notes: Earnings are deflated using the urban provincial-level spatial price deflators calculated by Brandt and Holz (2006) Table 2 . Notes: see Table 4 .
halshs-00550348, version 1 -27 Dec 2010 Tables 4 and 5 . Earnings are deflated using the urban provincial-level spatial price deflators calculated by Brandt and Holz (2006) Note: In national statistics, wages refer to the "total remuneration for labor paid by all organizations directly to all staff and workers of those entities". The reported classification by ownership does not distinguish foreign invested enterprises and private enterprises, which are all included in the category "others". Average annual wages of staff and workers are deflated by the urban consumer price index (1995=100).
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